textbook loan program, which the plurality upholds, from the … instructional materials and equipment loan program, which the majority finds unconstitutional”). The plurality’s mistaken assumptions explain and underscore its sharp break with the Framers’ understanding of establishment and this Court’s consistent interpretative course. Meek, 421 U. S., at 363; Wolman, 433 U. S., at 249–250. of Central School Dist. Rather, endorsement of the religious message is reasonably attributed to the individuals who select the path of the aid. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S. 41, 53–54, n. 20 (1999) (plurality opinion). Although the presence of private choice is easier to see when aid literally passes through individuals’ hands, there is no reason why the Establishment Clause requires such a form. 9—15. Citation22 Ill.530 U.S. 793, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 147 L. Ed. (c) Two rules offered by respondents to govern the determination whether Chapter 2 has the effect of advancing religion are rejected. In any event, since the same-terms feature of the scheme would, on the plurality’s view, rule out the attribution or perception of endorsement, adopting the plurality’s rule of facial evenhandedness would convert neutrality into a dispositive criterion of establishment constitutionality and eliminate the effects enquiry directed by Allen, Lemon, and other cases. But one crucial point must be borne in mind. (a) In modifying the Lemon test–which asked whether a statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement between government and religion, see 403 U.S., at 612—613–Agostini examined only the first and second of those factors, see 521 U.S., at 222—223, recasting the entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute’s effect, id., at 232—233. The most directly pertinent doctrinal statements here are these: no government “can pass laws which aid one religion [or] all religions … . See, e.g., Everson, 330 U. S., at 16 (discussing aid that approaches the “verge” of forbidden territory); Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612 (“[W]e can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law”); Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 760–761 (noting the “most perplexing questions” presented in this area and acknowledging “   ‘entangl[ing] precedents’   ”); Mueller, 463 U. S., at 393 (quoting Lemon); Witters, 474 U. S., at 485 (quoting Lemon). It looks to the same facts as the neutrality inquiry, see id., at 225–226, but uses those facts to answer a somewhat different question—whether the criteria for allocating the aid create a financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination, id., at 231. Accordingly, our approval of the aid in both cases relied to a significant extent on the fact that “[a]ny aid … that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.” Witters, supra, at 487; see Zobrest, supra, at 10 (“[A] government-paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian school only as a result of the private decision of individual parents”). 2–9. While the textbooks had a known and fixed secular content not readily divertible to religious teaching purposes, the adaptable materials did not.15 So, too, we explained the permissibility of busing on public routes to schools but not busing for field trips designed by religious authorities specifically because the latter trips were components of teaching in a pervasively religious school. Witters, supra, at 487–488 (discussing rule against “direct subsidy”). of Servs. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents 11, 22–25. The plurality misreads our precedent in suggesting that we have abandoned directness of distribution as a relevant consideration. Another judge then reversed that order, upholding Chapter 2 under, inter alia, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, in which a public school district was allowed to provide a sign-language interpreter to a deaf student at a Catholic high school as part of a federal program for the disabled. He relied primarily on Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, in which programs providing many of the same sorts of materials and equipment as does Chapter 2 were struck down, even though programs providing for the loan of public school textbooks to religious schools were upheld. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case concerning enforcement of the Espionage Act of 1917 during World War I. 127, 198–200 (1844); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U. S. 50, 81 (1908), or evaluated aid to schools under other provisions of the Constitution, see Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. The threat to Establishment Clause values was accordingly at its highest in the circumstances of this case. Respondents contend that Agostini should be limited to its facts, and point specifically to the following statement from my separate opinion in Ball as the basis for retaining a presumption of religious inculcation for instructional materials and equipment: “When full-time parochial school teachers receive public funds to teach secular courses to their parochial school students under parochial school supervision, I agree that the program has the perceived and actual effect of advancing the religious aims of the church-related schools. Actual diversion is constitutionally impermissible. When a religious school receives textbooks or instructional materials and equipment lent with secular restrictions, the school’s teachers need not refrain from teaching religion altogether. There the government provided only a translator who was not considered divertible because he did not add to or subtract from the religious message. Compare Wolman, supra, at 254; Levitt, supra, at 480, with supra, at 16; infra, at 23. Thus it bars the use of public funds for religious aid. The plurality, however, would reject that lesson. 32   I do not think it worthwhile to comment at length, for example, on the plurality’s clear misunderstanding of our access-to-public-forum cases, such as Lamb’s Chapel and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981), as “decisions that have prohibited governments from discriminating in the distribution of public benefits based on religious status or sincerity,” ante, at 30, when they were decided on completely different and narrowly limited free-speech grounds. Although the presence of private choice is easier to see when aid literally passes through the hands of individuals—which is why we have mentioned directness in the same breath with private choice, see, e.g., Agostini, supra, at 226; Witters, supra, at 487; Mueller, supra, at 399—there is no reason why the Establishment Clause requires such a form. In 1994, after having resolved the numerous other issues in the case, he issued an order permanently excluding pervasively sectarian schools in Jefferson Parish from receiving any Chapter 2 materials or equipment. See, e.g., ante, at 10 (“[N]o one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government”). 21—27. 46 F. 3d, at 1464–1465; see Board of Ed. Accordingly, I see no reason to affirm the judgment below and thereby declare a properly functioning aid program unconstitutional. Under the plurality’s rule of neutrality, if a program met the first part of the Lemon enquiry, by declining to define a program’s recipients by religion, it would automatically satisfy the second, in supposedly having no impermissible effect of aiding religion.19. The principal testified that the Chapter 2 computer would take over the network if another non-Chapter 2 computer were to break down. See Zobrest, 509 U. S., at 13, and n. 10. Because Chapter 2 aid is provided pursuant to private choices, it is not problematic that one could fairly describe Chapter 2 as providing “direct” aid. The State must confine itself to secular objectives, and neither advance nor impede religious activity. Hence, if we looked no further than evenhandedness, and failed to ask what activities the aid might support, or in fact did support, religious schools could be blessed with government funding as massive as expenditures made for the benefit of their public school counterparts, and religious missions would thrive on public money. 527 U. S. 1002 (1999). E.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 621–622, 624. It is beyond question that the plurality’s notion of evenhandedness neutrality as a practical guarantee of the validity of aid to sectarian schools would be the end of the principle of no aid to the schools’ religious mission. Ruling in early 1997 on postjudgment motions, he reversed the decision of former Chief Judge Heebe and upheld Chapter 2, pointing to several significant changes in the legal landscape over the previous seven years. In Allen, for example, although we did recognize that students themselves received and owned the textbooks, we also noted that the books provided were those that the private schools required for courses, that the schools could collect students’ requests for books and submit them to the board of education, that the schools could store the textbooks, and that the textbooks were essential to the schools’ teaching of secular subjects. Support Us! In short, Chapter 2 satisfies both the first and second primary criteria of Agostini. 469, the parties refer to the 1965 Act’s Title II program, as modified by subsequent legislation, as “Chapter 2.” For ease of reference, I will do the same.) A concern for divertibility, as opposed to improper content, is misplaced not only because it fails to explain why the sort of aid that we have allowed is permissible, but also because it is boundless—enveloping all aid, no matter how trivial—and thus has only the most attenuated (if any) link to any realistic concern for preventing an “establishment of religion.” Presumably, for example, government-provided lecterns, chalk, crayons, pens, paper, and paintbrushes would have to be excluded from religious schools under respondents’ proposed rule. Agostini next requires us to ask whether Chapter 2 “result[s] in governmental indoctrination.” 521 U. S., at 234. See also id., at 59a–62a. Tilton, 403 U. S., at 685–686. See 515 U. S., at 842 (collecting cases); id., at 846–847 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 608–609 (1988); compare Committee for Public Ed. What one would expect from such paltry efforts at monitoring and enforcement naturally resulted, and the record strongly suggests that other, undocumented diversions probably occurred as well. Under … In the instant case, because the Chapter 2 aid concerns only teaching tools that must remain supplementary, the aid comprises only a portion of the teacher’s educational efforts during any single class. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 783; Zobrest, 509 U. S., at 12. Although there is some dispute concerning the mandatory nature of these assurances, Dan Lewis, the director of Louisiana’s Chapter 2 program, testified that all of the State’s nonpublic schools had thus far been willing to sign the assurances, and that the State retained the power to cut off aid to any school that breached an assurance. Respondents filed suit in early December. Pp. We have “previously recognized that the provisions of the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute.” Everson v. Board of Ed. The program makes a broad array of schools eligible for aid without regard to their religious affiliations or lack thereof. 509 U. S., at 13, n. As the above description of the JPPSS monitoring process should make clear, Justice Souter’s citation of a statewide report finding a lack of monitoring in some Louisiana LEA’s is irrelevant as far as Jefferson Parish is concerned. And, because actual diversion is permissible under the plurality’s holding, the participating religious organizations (including churches) could use that aid to support religious indoctrination. Ante, at 34–36; see also App. Scattered de minimis statutory violations of the restrictions on content, discovered and remedied by the relevant authorities themselves before this litigation began almost 15 years ago, should not be elevated to such a level as to convert an otherwise unobjectionable parishwide program into a law that has the effect of advancing religion. v. Grumet, 512 U. S. 687 (1994), that “we have frequently relied explicitly on the general availability of any benefit provided religious groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause challenges,” id., at 704. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 657–659 (1980) (approving program providing religious school with “direct cash reimbursement” for expenses of standardized testing). 12   It is thus surprising for the dissent to accuse us of following a rule of “breathtaking … manipulability.” Post, at 36, n. 19. [T]he fact that aid goes to individuals means that the decision to support religious education is made by the individual, not by the State. Relying on Witters and Zobrest, we noted that our cases had taken a more forgiving view of neutral government programs that make aid available generally without regard to the religious or nonreligious character of the recipient school. This is just what Everson did. The allocation criteria therefore create no improper incentive. 125a (deposition of president of sectarian high school) (“Our teachers, whether they are religion teachers or not, are certainly instructed that when issues come up in the classroom that have a religious, moral, or value concept, that their answers be consistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church and that they respond in that way to the students, so that there can be opportunities in other classes other than religion where discussion of religio[n] could take place, yes, sir”); id., at 73a, 74a. The aid follows the child. 7—38. 75a, require attendance at daily religion classes, id., at 76a, conduct sacramental preparation classes during the schoolday, require attendance at mass, and provide extracurricular religious activities. (e) Applying the two relevant Agostini criteria reveals that there is no basis for concluding that Jefferson Parish’s Chapter 2 program has the effect of advancing religion. One of the objectives of the handbook is “[t]o encourage teachers to become committed Christians and to develop professional competence.” Id., at 146a. To be sure, Agostini only addressed the specific presumption that public-school employees teaching on the premises of religious schools would inevitably inculcate religion. Profile der Personen mit dem Namen Michelle Helms auf Facebook ansehen. There is no improper incentive because, under the statute, aid is allocated based on school enrollment. 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